The Government Accountability Office has published a report detailing what it says the U.S. Army and Air National Guard need to do to improve the safety of their helicopter operations.

Responding in part to 10 years of data that revealed 298 non-combat helicopter accidents between the Army and U.S. Air Force components of the National Guard, the GAO studied safety practices within the organizations. The agency analyzed accident data from fiscal years 2012 through 2021. The study also included document reviews and interviews with officials from a number of units

The GAO found that about 45 of the reported accidents in the study were considered serious, meaning that they included fatalities, permanent disability, extensive hospitalization, helicopter destruction or more than $500,000 of property damage. The accidents resulted in the deaths of 28 personnel.

According to GAO data analysis, the accidents were attributable mainly to human error reflecting problems like poor communication, overconfidence and failure to follow training standards.

In its report, the GAO made several recommendations to the secretaries of the Army and Air Force, including the establishment of systems for tracking the implementation status of recommendations.

The GAO also recommended that the Army and Air Force evaluate and update risk management for National Guard helicopter units, develop plans for recurrent evaluations of  helicopter aircrews, and examine the assignment and workloads of unit safety personnel.

Finally, the GAO recommended that the secretaries of both services oversee the development of “a comprehensive strategy that includes goals, priorities, and performance measures to address the challenges” that hinder Army National Guard and Air National Guard helicopter pilot training.

The post Army, Air National Guard Helicopter Accidents a Result of Human Error, GAO Finds appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The U.S. Coast Guard has released the names of the victims of Sunday’s floatplane accident off Whidbey Island near Seattle. The nine adults and one child are presumed dead. The pilot was Jason Winter. The nine passengers have been identified as Patricia Hicks, Sandra Williams, Lauren Hilty, Ross Mickel, Luke Ludwig, Rebecca Ludwig, Joanne Mera, Gabriella Hanna, and a child, Remy Mickel. They were aboard the 1967 de Havilland DHC-3 Turbine Otter that crashed in Mutiny Bay halfway between Friday Harbor and Renton. 

The search for survivors was called off at noon Monday. The bulk of the wreckage has not been located; however, some personal items believed to have come from the aircraft cabin and a 6-foot-by-18-inch piece of the fuselage with the aircraft tail number, N725TH, were recovered. The aircraft is registered to Northwest Seaplanes, a Part 135 charter and sightseeing company. 

Northwest Seaplanes is a family-owned business that was founded by Clyde Carlson in 1988. The aircraft was en route to Renton. Floatplanes fly between Renton and the San Juan Islands on a regular basis. 

Witnesses to the accident told officials that the aircraft dove straight into the water. Shortly after the crash, the body of a woman was recovered from the water by good samaritans. The body is in the possession of the coroner pending positive identification. 

The Coast Guard searched the area for more than 20 hours, from both the air and water hoping for survivors, but none were found. The average temperature of the water in the Puget Sound is roughly 54 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. The Coast Guard estimates a person can survive in such temperatures for no more than a few hours.

Witnesses described the weather at the time of the accident as “very windy.” One witness told a local television station that a floatplane trying to land on the water probably would have had damage to the floats.

There are no reports of the pilot issuing a distress call.

During a press conference Monday afternoon, a Coast Guard spokesperson said the decision to call off the search was a painful one, and was made only after the next of kin were notified.

As part of the search efforts, submersible search units were lowered into the water and the cellphones of the passengers were pinged, yet the wreckage was not found. 

According to a tweet from the U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard assets completed 26 search sorties covering 1,283 linear nautical miles and saturating an area of more than 2100 sq. nautical miles.”

What Happened

According to a tweet from Flightradar24, the last ADS-B signal from the aircraft was received at 22:08 UTC and the aircraft was showing a descent of 7,744 fpm. The altitude normally flown by Turbine Otters along this route is approximately 600 feet above the surface.

Whidbey Island has many homes along the beach. The Coast Guard is asking the public to notify them if they see an oil slick in the water or find wreckage. 

The accident came at the end of a busy weekend for the aircraft. Flightaware.com shows the aircraft made several trips from Renton Municipal Airport (KRNT), south of Seattle, to the San Juan Islands to the north. Because the aircraft was equipped with amphibious floats, it could operate from either water or land runways.

On Sunday, September 4 at 9:33 a.m., the aircraft took off from KRNT bound for Roche Harbor (WA09), according to the Coast Guard, though the seaplane base there is W39. The aircraft returned to KRNT, then departed for Windsock (4WA4) on Lopez Island, then to Friday Harbor, back to Roche Harbor, returned to Friday Harbor, and then launched on the accident flight back to Renton.

The aircraft’s last takeoff was from Friday Harbor at 2:50 p.m. local time Sunday. Its last ADS-B report was 18 minutes later near Oak Harbor. The Coast Guard reports the aircraft went down off Whidbey Island, approximately 34 nm northwest of Seattle. 

Northwest Seaplanes posted on its Facebook page: “The team at Northwest Seaplanes is heartbroken, we don’t know any details yet regarding the cause of the accident. We are working with the FAA, NTSB, and [Coast Guard]. We have been in communication with the families. We are praying for the families involved, including our pilot and his family.”

FLYING’s attempts to reach the company for comment were unsuccessful. A team from the National Transportation Safety Board arrived in Seattle Monday night. The investigation is expected to take one year to 18 months.

The post Coast Guard Releases Names of Floatplane Accident Victims appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Officials have identified the victims of last week’s deadly mid-air collision between a twin-engine Cessna 340A and a Cessna 152 in Watsonville, California. 

Carl Kruppa, 75, and Nannette Plett-Kruppa, 67, from Winton, California, and their dog were aboard the 340. Stuart Camenson, 32, from Santa Cruz was piloting the 152, according to the Santa Cruz County Sheriff-Coroner. The aircraft collided while on approach to Runway 20 at Watsonville Municipal Airport (KWVI) just before 3 p.m. on August 18. All occupants of the two aircraft were pronounced dead at the scene. 

• READ MORE: California Mid-Air Collision Leaves Three Dead

According to the National Transportation Safety Board, the 152—which was believed to be piloted by Camenson—was flying in the pattern when the 340—believed to be flown by Kruppa—performed a straight-in entry to the pattern with intent to land. The pilots were in radio communication with each other. In his last transmission, Camenson noted that the 340 was coming up behind him quickly, and announced he was going to go around. Both aircraft were on final approach when they collided.

Authorities Looking at Speed

Among the factors authorities are looking at is the speed of the 340. An ADS-B record shows the 340 approaching the airport at approximately 180 knots. The normal flap extension speed for the aircraft is 160 knots, and the landing gear extension is 140 knots, so it is unclear if the aircraft was actually configured for landing.

There were several witnesses to the accident. According to the San Jose Mercury News, 26-year-old Franky Herrera of Watsonville said the aircraft were at an altitude of approximately 200 feet when the twin-engine aircraft banked hard to the right, but clipped the wing of the 152. 

A security camera across the street from the airport caught images of wreckage falling from the sky as the 152 spiraled to the ground and came to rest in a field near the airport. Herrera said the other airplane continued for a few more seconds "but was struggling," the Mercury News reported. The twin crashed into a hangar at the other end of the airport and exploded in flames.

There were no injuries on the ground.

A single-engine Cessna 152 with one person on board and a twin-engine Cessna 340 with two people on board collided as they were attempting to land at Watsonville Municipal Airport. https://t.co/4Ktpi6x1FD

— CBS News (@CBSNews) August 19, 2022

The Cessna 340A was registered to ALM Holding LLC and the 152 was registered to Monterey Bay Aviation and was part of the rental fleet at the Watsonville-based United Flight Service.

Multiple agencies responded to Watsonville Municipal Airport after 2 planes attempting to land collided. We have reports of multiple fatalities.

Report came in at 2:56pm.

Investigation is underway, updates to follow. pic.twitter.com/pltHIAyw5p

— City of Watsonville (@WatsonvilleCity) August 18, 2022

According to the FAA registry, Kruppa held a private pilot certificate for both single and multiengine aircraft.

Camenson could not be located in the registry, but family members told local media that he earned his private pilot certificate in 2020 and was an "avid flyer."

Both the NTSB and the FAA are investigating the crash. The preliminary report is expected to be released within a week. The final report could take up to two years to complete and be made public.

The post Watsonville Mid-Air Collision Victims Identified appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

“My airplane!”

I was four days away from my private pilot check ride. My CFI, an Air Force Academy graduate, was with me as I practiced specialty takeoffs and landings at the towered airport. I had just completed the pre-landing GUMPS check on downwind, when he cried out the magic phrase—”I have the controls”—and I replied, “Your airplane!” and let go.

He put us into a steep turn to the left. A nanosecond later I saw why—a Beech Baron was approaching from 45 degrees, on our right and slightly above and behind us.

The pilot of the twin made a radio call announcing entry to the downwind. The tower controller admonished the twin driver that they had “almost run over a Cessna 152 in the pattern.” The twin pilot replied, “I didn’t see him.”

Welcome to the world of the “almost” mid-air. On a good day, the “near miss” becomes a story you tell. On a bad day, you end up on national television.

The Swiss Cheese Model

One of the first things you learn in aviation is that you can do everything right, respecting the weather, your skills, and the aircraft, and you can follow the procedures outlined in the AIM, make the right radio calls, etc., but if someone else does something wrong, you can still pay the price. It’s the classic Swiss cheese model—when the random acts line up like the holes in the cheese, accidents happen.

This statement is particularly poignant in light of recent mid-air collisions—the first in Las Vegas on July 17 involving a Piper PA-46-350P JetProp and a Cessna 172, and the second on August 18 in Watsonville, California, involving a twin Cessna 340A and a Cessna 152. Both accidents happened when the pilots were attempting to land.

According to the FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook, most mid-air collisions happen in the airport traffic pattern—usually when both aircraft are heading in the same direction. It is often the result of a faster airplane overtaking a slower one, and the combination of a high wing vs. a low wing design resulting in blind spots that prove fatal.

In the Las Vegas event, the pilot of the Piper, which was the faster aircraft, lined up to land on Runway 30R at North Las Vegas Airport (KVGT), despite acknowledging the clearance to land on Runway 30L several times. Overshooting Runway 30L put the Piper into the path of the Cessna 172. The Piper is a low wing and the Cessna is a high wing, so it is possible that their respective wings blocked their view of each other until it was too late.

• READ MORE: NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Las Vegas Mid-Air

In the Watsonville accident, the pilot of the Cessna 152, who was based at Watsonville Municipal Airport (KWVI), was practicing touch and gos. According to records from FlightAware.com, the pilot of the 340 frequently made flights to KWVI. Based on this information, it would be safe to bet that both pilots were aware of the traffic pattern procedures at the non-towered facility. Judging from the amount of radio traffic LiveATC.com captured that afternoon, Watsonville was busy at the time of the accident, with a few airplanes in the pattern, yet the pilot of the 340 chose to do a straight-in approach.

Speed as a Factor

One of the first lessons learned as a multiengine pilot is to use the word "twin" in your callsign to let people know you are likely faster than any single-engine aircraft in the pattern. Flying a pattern in a twin-engine aircraft requires you to be very much on your game as the speed makes it very easy for you to overtake the average single in the pattern. For this reason, many twin pilots choose to do straight-in approaches at non-towered airports. These are not prohibited by the FARs, but they are often litigated in the court of public opinion on the ramp and in social media as to whether they present a safety hazard. Many pilots prefer not to do them as they feel they can create unnecessary risk.

The ADS-B information from the Watsonville event indicates the airspeed of the 340 was around 180 knots on final approach. The pilot had announced a "full stop landing," however, the flap extension speed for the 340 is 160 knots and landing gear extension speed is 140 knots. At the time this article was published, it had not been determined if the 340 was actually configured for landing, despite the pilot's verbalized intentions.

The pilots of the 152 and the 340 were in radio contact just prior to the collision. The 340 pilot reported a 3-mile final and a 1-mile final, and reported looking for the Cessna 152, which had reported turning base. The pilot of the 152 turned on final in front of the 340. The last transmission from the pilot of the 152 indicated that he could see the 340—either out the window or on the ADS-B, we don't know—and as he noted the 340 was coming up fast behind him, the 152 pilot announced he was going around.

According to eyewitnesses, it appeared the pilot of the low-wing 340 saw the high-wing 152 at the last second, as the larger aircraft banked hard to the right but still flew through the 152 "like a missile." Security cameras across the street caught the wreckage falling from the sky and what was left of the smaller airplane as it spiraled into a field short off the runway. The 340 continued forward, then crashed into the end row of hangars, sending up a fireball.

The NTSB preliminary report on the accident should be available in approximately two weeks.

• READ MORE: Three Killed in California Mid-Air Collision

The Myth: The Tower or ATC Prevents Mid-Air Collisions

There is a commonly held myth—especially among the aviation-challenged—that the presence of a control tower prevents mid-air collisions. While the extra set of eyes and situational awareness provided by the tower is helpful and appreciated, it is not an iron-clad preventative, as proven in the Las Vegas accident where both aircraft had the benefit of a tower.

Most airports in the U.S. are non-towered, also known as pilot-controlled. The lack of a tower doesn't make these airports any more dangerous than a lack of stop lights at every intersection makes them more dangerous than those that have traffic lights.

As long as drivers—and pilots—see and avoid traffic and follow the rules of the pattern, instructions, and procedures, accidents can be avoided.

No matter where we are flying, be it a towered or non-towered airport, pilots are responsible to see and avoid other air traffic —and to act accordingly. Straight-in approaches have their place and must be learned and practiced just like those that require a pattern. Straight-in landings are more common at towered airports, especially as part of an instrument approach, and the first time a learner does one, it's often rushed, despite the use of a checklist. The straight-in approach can deprive you of the cues that help you configure and stabilize the aircraft for landing, such as "reduce engine power abeam the intended point of touch down" and "apply the notch of flaps before turning base." Without these cues, it is easy to get behind the airplane.

When and Where Mid-Airs Happen

One of the common questions after a mid-air is why they can happen on sunny VFR days. More aircraft are flying on these days, so the probability increases—this is particularly true if the VFR day happens at a time of year when VFR days are rare, like in the middle of winter—pilots come out in droves.

According to the FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook (AFM), mid-airs are more likely in places where aircraft congregate—such as over VORs, popular sightseeing spots, IFR fixes, VFR practice areas and the big Kahuna: in the vicinity of airports, especially during the approach to landing. The AFM adds the sobering information: mid-air collisions are most likely to happen when the aircraft are below 1,000 feet and traveling in the same direction—such as on final approach.

Tools for Prevention of Mid-Airs

• Sterile cockpit for takeoff and landing—if you have a passenger/copilot, let them know the only acceptable conversation at this time is a warning about traffic or other safety of flight issues.
• Pattern entry should be done using published procedures that are airport specific or in the absence of these, refer to Chapter 4 of the AIM.
• When entering on the 45, be at pattern altitude, to avoid descending on to someone or accidentally climbing into someone who is overflying the airport at 500 feet above the published pattern altitude.
• Departure from the pattern should comply with locally published procedures or Chapter 4 of the AIM.
• Listen to and make radio calls per the AIM. 
• Make precise position reports including altitude—example: "Red and white Cessna, 5 miles east of the airport, 2,000 feet, for landing Runway 35."
• Know how to use ADS-B to keep track of traffic around you.
• Get flight following, if able and appropriate when practicing maneuvers.
• Know where the IFR fixes are and keep an eye and an ear out for aircraft practicing approaches—especially on VFR days.
• If the use of a practice area frequency is more appropriate, use it for better situational awareness.
• Keep your eyes outside at least 90 percent of the time and remember, of all the rights worth dying for, "right of way" is not one of them. Follow the right-of-way rules in the FAR/AIM—if in doubt, give way to aircraft with greater speed and tonnage, departing the pattern, and maneuvering to reenter the pattern on the 45.

The post Strategies To Avoid Mid-Air Collisions appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Three people have been killed in a mid-air collision of two Cessna aircraft in Santa Cruz County, California, according to authorities. 

The accident happened Thursday just before 3 p.m. at Watsonville Municipal Airport (KWVI). The first notification came from a Twitter post from the City of Watsonville.

Multiple agencies responded to Watsonville Municipal Airport after 2 planes attempting to land collided. We have reports of multiple fatalities.

Report came in at 2:56pm.

Investigation is underway, updates to follow. pic.twitter.com/pltHIAyw5p

— City of Watsonville (@WatsonvilleCity) August 18, 2022

The airport is a non-towered facility with intersecting runways, 9/27 and 2/20. According to city officials, the aircraft involved were a Cessna 152 and a twin-engine Cessna 340A. Both were attempting to land on Runway 20 at the time.

There was one person onboard the 152, and two people onboard the 340. All three died in the accident.

Wreckage from the smaller aircraft landed in a field outside the airport. Video of the scene shows the front end of the aircraft smashed. The 340 crashed into a hangar next to the runway.

“We are absolutely saddened to hear about the tragic incident that took the lives of several people,” said a post on Watsonville’s Twitter account. “The City of Watsonville sends its deepest condolences to the friends and family of those who passed.”

No one on the ground was injured.

We are absolutely saddened to hear about the tragic incident that took the lives of several people.

The City of Watsonville sends its deepest condolences to the friends and family of those who passed. pic.twitter.com/DWxBDrjxpi

— City of Watsonville (@WatsonvilleCity) August 19, 2022

ATC Recordings

The 340, tail number N740WJ, was registered to ALM Holding LLC, according to the FAA. The ADS-B data app Flightaware shows the aircraft departed from Turlock Municipal Airport (O15) approximately 74 nm away at 2:32 p.m. and headed straight for KWVI. The aircraft was in the air for approximately 23 minutes.

The 152, N49931, was registered to Monterey Bay Aviation, according to Flightaware, the 152 was in the pattern for Runway 20.

LiveATC captured the transmissions of the aircraft in the pattern at the non-towered airport. 

There were several aircraft in the vicinity of the airport and in the pattern when at 22:07 on the recording, the pilot of the twin announced their intention to do a straight-in approach to Runway 20 at Watsonville. The pilot repeated this transmission at 22:17.

At 24:12 in the recording: The pilot of the 340 reported a 3-mile final for Runway 20. The next transmission is from the 152 pilot who reported turning left base.

The 340 pilot stated: "Looking for traffic on left base."

The 152 pilot responded: "Yeah, I see you, you're behind me."

The last transmission from the 152 pilot is: "I'm going to go around, you're coming at me pretty quick."

Two small planes collided in Watsonville, California, while trying to land at a local airport on Thursday and at least two of the three occupants were killed, officials said. https://t.co/IQ23KTQgM9 pic.twitter.com/M5UeVpnxmw

— The Associated Press (@AP) August 19, 2022

Approach Speed

The next transmission is someone warning the other pilots about the aircraft accident at Watsonville.

ADS-B data shows the 340 in the airport traffic pattern at a speed of 182 knots. The normal approach speed for a 340 in the landing configuration is approximately 117 knots.

In an interview with a local photojournalist, a passing motorist said he saw the 340 approaching the airport and was surprised by how fast it was traveling. He did not see the other airplane until impact, saying the 340 hit the 152 “like a missile,” and the 152 “went end-over-end losing its wing” and the sky filled with debris.

He then described an explosion, fire, and smoke rising from the hangar where the 340 crashed.

The wing of the 152 was recovered from a city street outside the airport and away from the main wreckage.

A witness on the ground told the Santa Cruz Sentinel that the aircraft were about 200 feet in the air when they collided.

The NTSB and FAA are investigating the crash.

UPDATE: The two planes that crashed at Watsonville Municipal Airport collided while attempting to land, the city says. https://t.co/KUM6ndF9s8 pic.twitter.com/VRcUnZSxQT

— NBC Bay Area (@nbcbayarea) August 18, 2022

About the Airport

KWVI has two runways, Runway 2/20 measuring 4,501 feet by 149 feet and Runway 9/27, measuring 3,998 feet by 98 feet. 

The airport was built in 1931 and expanded during World War II when it became an Auxiliary Navy base. It was used by airships for coastal patrol until 1945, and became a training base for fighters. 

After the war, the airport was turned into a civilian field and eventually became the home of a popular vintage aircraft airshow.

The post Three Killed in California Mid-Air Collision appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

According to the National Transportation Safety Board, the copilot of a skydiving aircraft that made an emergency landing July 29 at Raleigh, North Carolina, intentionally departed the aircraft in flight without a parachute. According to the surviving pilot, the copilot was upset about the hard landing that damaged the airplane.

The report, released Tuesday, comes nearly three weeks after the CASA 212-200 was substantially damaged by a hard landing near Raeford, North Carolina. 

• READ MORE: Copilot’s Departure of Aircraft in Mid-Flight Baffles Authorities

According to the surviving pilot—who was acting as pilot-in-command (PIC)—they had flown two skydiving runs, then descended to Raeford West Airport (NR20) to pick up a third group of skydivers. The CASA 212 is a fixed-gear design with a ramp that lowers in the rear to allow for the egress of skydivers.

At the time of the accident, only the PIC and copilot—also known as the second-in-command (SIC) in the report—were on board.

The SIC was flying an approach that, according to the PIC, was “on heading, altitude and airspeed” at Raeford until the airplane descended below the tree line and the aircraft encountered an abrupt and uncommanded loss of altitude.

Both pilots called for a go-around, which the SIC initiated, but he was unable to prevent the aircraft from landing hard on the runway. The impact damaged the right main landing gear. 

The PIC assumed the flight controls when the aircraft reached 400 feet agl and flew a low pass over the runway so airfield personnel could verify the damage, as the landing gear of the aircraft is not visible from the cockpit. 

The personnel subsequently called the PIC to let him know that they had recovered the fractured landing gear on the runway. 

The PIC directed the SIC to declare an emergency and request a diversion to Raleigh Durham International Airport (KRDU), some 78 nm away, for an emergency landing.

Crew Coordinated with ATC

According to the PIC, while en route to Raleigh, the crew coordinated with air traffic control operations and planned their approach and landing at KRDU. The SIC was responsible for communicating with air traffic control while the PIC flew the airplane.

In Live ATC recordings of conversations between the aircraft and air traffic controllers, a pilot aboard the CASA 212 (using the callsign “Shady 2”) is heard declaring an emergency, stating “We have lost our right wheel. We’d like to proceed to Raleigh and make the landing at Raleigh.”

ATC confirmed that Raleigh-Durham was the desired airport and advised Shady 2 to resume its own navigation to Raleigh-Durham. 

ATC asked for information about the home base of the aircraft, how many people were on board, and the amount of fuel. The pilot’s transmission indicated there were two people on board and they had enough fuel for approximately four hours of flying. 

Later in the transmission, ATC asked for verification that a wheel was missing from the aircraft as the result of a landing. The pilot replied, “affirmative.” Another voice replied, “the wheel assembly has been found.” A second voice from Shady 2 explained there was a hard landing and the aircraft went around “and at that point, we lost the wheel.”

A few minutes later, the controller supplied Shady 2 with the telephone number for Fayetteville Approach to call when they were on the ground. The next transmission was Shady 2 checking in as they passed through 3,500 feet.

Pilot: Copilot Became Visibly Upset

The PIC told investigators that there was moderate turbulence during the flight, and that about 20 minutes into the diversion, after conducting approach and emergency briefings, the SIC became visibly upset about the hard landing. 

The PIC stated that the SIC then opened his side cockpit window and "may have gotten sick," and the PIC took over radio communications. The SIC then lowered the ramp in the back of the airplane indicating that he felt like he was going to be sick and needed air.

According to the NTSB report, the SIC "got up from his seat, removed his headset, apologized, and departed the airplane via the aft ramp door."

The PIC stated there was a bar one could grab about 6 feet above the ramp, but he did not see the SIC grab the bar before exiting the airplane.

Next, the PIC turned the airplane to the right to search for the SIC and notified air traffic control that his co-pilot had departed the airplane without a parachute.

The body of the SIC was found a short time later in the backyard of a home some 20 miles from the airport.

The PIC proceeded on course to KRDU, where he performed a low-approach and then emergency landing. The airplane departed the right side of the runway and came to rest upright in the grass. The PIC sustained minor injuries.

The post-accident examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the right main landing gear, the landing gear fittings, and the airframe structure where the fittings attach.

The post NTSB Preliminary Report Sheds Light on Copilot Mid-Air Departure appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The National Transportation Safety Board has released its final report regarding the crash of a Cessna 182 that was part of the Red Bull Airplane Swap stunt.

The stunt, which was streamed on Hulu on April 24, 2022, involved pilots and skydivers Luke Aikins, 48, and Andy Farrington, 39, flying a pair of modified C-182s.

The plan was to fly the aircraft to an altitude of more than 12,000 feet above the Arizona desert. The pilots would then put the aircraft into synchronous steep dives, bail out of their respective airplanes wearing parachutes, and maneuver in freefall in order to enter each other’s airplane. Once aboard, they would recover the aircraft from their descents and land normally.

The aircraft were modified with a range of equipment including aerodynamic brakes to keep them from gaining excessive speed in the near-vertical dive, and grab bars to help Aikins and Farrington get back into the airplanes during the plunge. The 182s each included a custom autopilot designed to maintain an unusually steep descent path.

What Happened

Video of the event shows the aircraft entering the nose down attitude and the pilots departing the cockpits. As Aikins departed the accident aircraft, the nose pitched up and it entered an inverted spin. Aikins was able to enter the other aircraft and fly it to the landing spot.

Farrington chose not to attempt to enter the spinning aircraft and instead descended to the ground via parachute.

According to the NTSB, the probable cause of the crash was a ballast shift aboard the unoccupied aircraft that resulted in it exceeding the critical angle of attack. The aircraft entered a stall and subsequent spin from which it did not recover.

Investigators noted the accident aircraft was equipped with a ballistic parachute that was designed to trigger at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The parachute did activate while the airplane was inverted, but it did not fully deploy. The aircraft hit the ground and was substantially damaged. It was noted in the final report that the NTSB did not travel to the site of the accident.

Because of the nature of the stunt, practice in advance of the streaming on Hulu was not an option, as Farrington stated on the Red Bull website: “There is no way to test it until you do it.”

• READ MORE: FAA Revokes Certificates of Red Bull Plane Swap Pilots

FAA Revokes Pilot Certificates

The FAA noted that Aikins and Farrignton did not have permission to perform the stunt. In a statement issued to FLYING shortly after the stunt failed, the agency noted it “denied the organizer’s request for an exemption from federal regulations that cover the safe operation of an aircraft.” Aikin later admitted in an Instagram post that he had received the FAA denial but he did not inform Red Bull or his team members.

Following the failed stunt in May, the FAA issued an emergency revocation of both Aikin’s and Farrington’s pilot certificates. Neither one will be able to apply for or be issued a new airman certificate for one year. The FAA also proposed a $4,932 fine for Aikins for violating three regulations: FAR 91.105(a) flight crew members remaining at their stations, 91.113(b) the duty of the pilot to see and avoid other aircraft and 91.13 the operation of an aircraft in a careless and reckless manner.

The post NTSB Releases Final Report on Red Bull Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The National Transportation Safety Board has released its preliminary report regarding the investigation into the midair collision of two aircraft at North Las Vegas Airport (KVGT). The accident happened on July 17. Four people were killed when a Piper Malibu Mirage and a Cessna 172 collided while on approach to Runway 30R around noon in clear, sunny skies.

The airport has parallel runways: 30L, measuring  5,000 feet by 75 feet, and 30R, which measures 4,199 feet by 75 feet. 

The approach end of Runway 30L is approximately 1,000 feet north of the approach end of Runway 30R. Runway 30L is a non-precision runway. Runway 30R  is a precision runway with aiming point and touchdown zone markings, which help distinguish it visually from 30L.

A husband and wife were aboard the Piper. According to a radio transmission made to another pilot in the pattern, the couple in the Piper were flying in from Idaho. The occupants of the Cessna were a flight instructor and learner in the pattern for Runway 30R, practicing takeoffs and landings.

According to the NTSB preliminary investigation, both airplanes were in contact with the tower at the time of the accident. 

The Piper had been cleared to land on Runway 30L and had acknowledged the clearance three times in three separate transmissions, but continued flying toward 30R.

The collision occurred approximately 0.25 miles from the approach end of Runway 30R.

Accident Timeline

1156:08

Piper N97CX is on an IFR flight plan and approaching from the north. Nellis Radar Approach Control clears N97CX for the visual approach at KVGT and instructs the pilot to overfly the airport at midfield for left traffic to Runway 30L. 

1158:26

Air traffic control responsibility for the flight is transferred from Nellis Radar Approach Control to the North Las Vegas tower, and Piper N97CX is instructed to fly left traffic for Runway 30L. 

Meanwhile, Cessna N160RA is instructed to fly right traffic for Runway 30R. The ADS-B records for the day show the Cessna had already made several laps in the pattern for 30R.

1158:43

The pilot of N97CX contacts KVGT tower and reports: “Descending out of 7,600 feet msl for landing on three zero left and ah Nellis said to cross midfield.” 

The tower controller replies, “Continue for three zero left.” 

The pilot acknowledges the transmission with, “Okay continue for runway three zero left nine seven charlie x-ray, we will cross over midfield.” 

1200:03

The pilot of N160RA requests a “short approach.” 

The tower controller replies, “zero romeo alpha short approach approved, runway three zero right, cleared for the option.” 

Cessna N160RA acknowledges the transmission. 

1201:36

The tower controller transmits, “November seven charlie x-ray runway three zero left cleared to land.”

The pilot of N97CX responds, “Three zero left cleared to land nine seven charlie x-ray.” 

The ADS-B track shows the Piper in a left turn, but it does not appear to be lining up with Runway 30 Left, rather the aircraft is swinging wide as if to land on the parallel Runway 30R.

1201:57

The tower controller transmits, “Seven charlie x-ray I think I said it right, runway three zero left, seven charlie x-ray runway three zero left.” 

The pilot of N97CX replies, “Yeah, affirmative runway three zero left, that’s what I heard nine seven charlie x-ray.” 

This is the final transmission from both aircraft, and they collide approximately a quarter of a mile from the approach end of Runway 30R.

The FAA illustration included in the NTSB report based on the ADS-B data shows both aircraft had lined up for Runway 30R.

Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the right wing of the Piper and the left wing of the Cessna collide before both aircraft plunged to the ground.

Photographs of the Piper wreckage show the Piper fuselage primarily intact. The NTSB report mentioned longitudinal scratches were visible along the right side of the fuselage.

The NTSB also noted damage to the Piper’s right wing, including “impact separation” and the right inboard wing section, which remained attached to the fuselage, was canted aft. The right wing flap was fractured about midspan. The crush impressions to the leading edge of the wing contained flakes of green primer, and there were cuts to the de-ice boot.

The Cessna, missing most of the left wing, hit the ground in a nose-low attitude, coming to rest inverted on a 304-degree magnetic heading. Also, the aircraft burned, the report said.

According to the NTSB, “About 4 [feet] of the left wing, which included the left aileron, was separated from the left wing, and was found on the edge of a culvert just south of the main wreckage. The left outboard wing section aft of the forward spar was found to be separated near the aileron-flap junction. The left wing flap was found to be separated from the wing.” 

Blue paint transfer was found on the lower surface of the separated left wing and the lower surface of the left wing flap. Black de-ice boot material transfer was observed on the lower surface of the separated outboard left wing, and the lower surface of the attached portion of the left wing, stretching about 5 feet outboard of the strut attach point, along the lower leading edge.

Most of the Cessna was consumed by fire, excluding the cabin roof.

The final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. NTSB investigations can take a year to 18 months to complete.

The post NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Las Vegas Midair appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Headset, kneeboard—seat belt cutter? How many of you carry these items with you every time you fly? John La Porta, 66, a flight instructor from Seattle, Washington, has added the latter to his must-haves when he flies, after he experienced an uncommanded loss of engine power last week and ended up putting the airplane into the water just off Alki Beach in West Seattle.

“If a total loss of oil pressure is accompanied by a rise in oil temperature, there is good reason to suspect an engine failure is imminent” so sayeth the pilots operating handbook of the Cessna 150. La Porta lived this on Tuesday, July 26. 

He was flying a 150 from Tacoma Narrows Airport (KTIW) back to its base at King County International/Boeing Field (KBFI) when he noticed a drop in oil pressure. The route he was flying was one of the approved VFR approaches into KBFI and requires the aircraft to cross the Puget Sound at an altitude below 2,000 feet to avoid encroaching on the Class B airspace that protects Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (KSEA). When aircraft approach KBFI they must be below 1,100 feet to avoid the descending shelf of Class B airspace.

La Porta is a retired Boeing technician and a current CFI teaching out of KBFI. He was flying  an aircraft that belongs to Alternate Air, a flying club based at KBFI. He was very familiar with the airplane, as he flew it often with learners, but on this particular flight he was alone.

A small airplane was removed from Puget Sound Wednesday morning, a day after the plane’s pilot crashed it 50 feet off Alki Point in West Seattle, officials said. Watch video of the crash here. https://t.co/DH1SJePfSY

— The Seattle Times (@seattletimes) July 28, 2022

He’d flown to KTIW that day so a mechanic could address the seat rail airworthiness directive (AD) required every 100 hours for specific Cessna aircraft. According to the Federal Registry, the AD takes approximately an hour per seat as the rails, seat rail holes, seat pin engagement, seat rollers, washers, and axle bolts or bushings, wall thickness of the roller housing and the tang, and lock pin springs are inspected to ensure the seat will not slide out of position. Once the physical inspection for the AD is complied with, the mechanic signs off the work in the aircraft logbook.

“I had all the logbooks with me,” La Porta noted. “And they went into the Sound with the airplane,”

Inspection

Just before 4 p.m., the work was completed and La Porta, a pilot with 6,500 hours of experience, performed a preflight inspection. He had to return to KBFI because he had an appointment with a learner at 4:15 p.m. The flight back to KBFI takes approximately 10 to 15 minutes. During the inspection at KBFI, he had noted that the aircraft needed oil, so he added some, then carefully tightened the cap on the filler neck.

The winds were favoring takeoffs and landings to the north, so La Porta took off from Runway 35.  Pilots are careful to hug the shoreline of Vashon Island and to stay below the Class B airspace, which begins at 2,000 feet.

“I was just past the north tip of Vashon when I noticed the oil pressure was low and dropping,” La Porta recalled, “and the oil temperature was rising.” 

‘I Was a Glider’

La Porta, who has been a pilot since 1974 and knows the airspace around Seattle very well, knew he was in trouble—especially if he tried to execute the VFR Vashon Arrival to KBFI, which would bring the aircraft down to 1,100 feet over houses, streets and the hilly terrain of West Seattle.

He asked the KBFI controller to allow him to deviate further north so that he could head for Alki Beach. Although it does have homes and businesses along the water, it is less populated than the route required by the Vashon Arrival. He estimated he was at an altitude of approximately 1,700 to 1,800 feet as he crossed the Sound.

“Essentially, I was a glider,” he said.

There is a grass runway on Vashon Island that was behind him, but it is surrounded by tall trees and measures 2,001 feet by 60 feet, which can be challenging on a good day. As he was not having a good day, he dismissed the idea, and focused on going ahead.

“I knew that I did not want to go through Vashon Arrival because that would put me under the 1,1,00 foot shelf,” La Porta explained. He noted that although he did not declare an emergency—he was too busy trying to find a place to put the aircraft down—and when he told ATC he had low oil pressure, they worked with him, understanding that he was having an issue.

As he crossed the water, La Porta managed the aircraft at best glide speed and continued troubleshooting. As he saw the oil temperature rise, the throttle lever became useless. Adjusting its position had no effect on engine power output, he said.

The controller cleared La Porta for a right turn to put him on a base leg for the runway, but La Porta replied, “I would love to but I can’t. I don’t have power anymore.”

The right turn would have put him into a West Seattle neighborhood or possibly on State Highway 509 if he was lucky, but La Porta decided the safer thing to do for both him and people on the ground was to ditch the aircraft off Alki Beach.

“I had twenty gallons of fuel on board and I did not want to take a chance of fire or landing in a ravine with uneven terrain or landing on a road and dodging powerlines, and there were lots of house and people there, so I said instinctively, no, not going that way,” he explained.

La Porta tightened the lap belt and cinched the shoulder harness as tightly as he could. “I could see the water getting closer and closer,” he recalled. He did not lower the flaps to 40 degrees per the ditching instructions in the POH, but that may have been a blessing as the flaps would have possibly blocked his egress from the aircraft when the aircraft flipped over.

Ditching

Ditching is something civilian pilots are required to learn about, but do not have the opportunity to practice. According to those who have experienced it in small aircraft, impact with the water is hard, like hitting cement, and very often the windscreen pops out and the pilot and front seat passenger get a face full of water like being hit by a firehose. The sudden deceleration throws them forward—if they are lucky, the shoulder harness keeps them from slamming into the panel.

“I closed my eyes at impact, and I felt the landing gear hit and the airplane went up on its nose, then went over on its back,” he says. “I was upside down but couldn’t tell inside the aircraft.”

The next sensation La Porta had was the seatbelts pinning him in and water rushing into the airplane.

“The seatbelts saved my life. Without the shoulder harness I probably would have gone into the panel, but as I was hanging with my full body weight on the seatbelt, I could not get the belts to release until the airplane’s tail settled into the water. I had one hand on the window and I was able to sort of stretch up and take a breath of air, and then I found the lap belt and was able to get it undone. I held on to the window as I released the shoulder harness and then I swam out of the window.”

“There were three people in the water with me,” he says. “There was a guy saying ‘Give me your hand! Give me your hand!’ and he pulled me along until my feet could touch the bottom, and then there was a woman who was a retired EMT who helped me. They asked if there was anyone else in the airplane and I said, ‘No.’”

La Porta warned his rescuers that he had been exposed to COVID a few days earlier, but they said that didn’t make a difference as they helped him ashore.

The water temperature of the Puget Sound averages around 52 degrees Fahrenheit, and people who take unexpected dips in the water often experience rapid onset of hypothermia. The day La Porta went in, the Pacific Northwest was experiencing a heatwave. Outside temperatures were in the 90s. He was uninjured except for some scrapes from going out through the window.

Several people on the shore witnessed the ditching, he said. “One of them was a man who was an airline pilot for 15 years. He told me I did a good job and that there was white smoke training from the airplane.”

A bystander on the beach captured video of La Porta’s ditching—it made the television news both locally and nationally. Friends of La Porta recognized the aircraft and there were some frantic moments as calls to his cellphones went unanswered—until people realized the phones were likely onboard the aircraft with him.

“They’re in the Sound, along with my kneeboard, which came flying off when I hit the water,” he says. “I managed to get out with my headset, I have no idea how it became unplugged.”

Within minutes, the local fire department and law enforcement were on scene. After being checked out by medical personnel, La Porta found himself on a conference call with the FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board—already starting the accident investigation.

What We Learn from La Porta

Ditching is one of those exercises pilot’s review but do not practice because it is normally not practical—you don’t put a perfectly good airplane into the drink. La Porta noted that although ditching procedures for a 1970s-era Cessna 150 are printed in the POH, there is no mention that the seat belts can become jammed.

“I have been flying out of Boeing Field since 1975, I have done hundreds of crossings over the water and it didn’t even occur to me that the seat belt would not release if there is pressure on it. I am carrying a seat belt cutter from now on and making sure my learners—and maybe everyone who is a passenger on the aircraft has one on all flights.”

La Porta says he was lucky in many ways—he was able to ditch so close to shore, the shoulder harness kept him from going into the panel, and there were bystanders who took action to rescue him—and perhaps the most important thing, he says, was that he did not have a learner with him at the time, because if he had trouble getting his seat belt off, his learner probably would have as well, and one them might have drowned.

The aircraft was pulled from the water on Wednesday, July 27. Both the FAA and the NTSB will be examining the wreckage.

La Porta noted the windscreen was broken, but there did not appear to be extensive structural damage to the wings and empennage. The cause of the loss of oil pressure has not been determined, he said, noting that there are any number of reasons as mechanical things break. Ironically, the aircraft was coming up on its annual inspection, and there were plans to redo the radios and install a new engine on the airplane.

La Porta returned to the skies a few days later. He routinely flies several times a day. When asked if the accident has changed him, he replied he’s now an advocate of shoulder harnesses, which are required in aircraft certified after December 2, 1986, but not before.

“If you don’t have them in your airplane, get them retrofitted in,” he said. “And add a seat belt cutter to your cockpit equipment.”

The post Ditching a Cessna 150 appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Federal authorities and those in Wake County, North Carolina, are trying to determine the circumstances surrounding the departure of a non-parachute-wearing copilot from an aircraft in mid-flight heading toward Raleigh-Durham International Airport (KRDU).

The airplane, a Spanish made CASA C-212 Aviocar, is an unpressurized, high-wing, turboprop with fixed landing gear. Registered to Spore LTD, in Colorado, the C-212 is designed for cargo hauling and is popular with skydiving operations.

According to local authorities, the pilot and copilot were the only persons on board when the aircraft  took off from Raeford West Airport (NR20) around 1:10 p.m. Friday, July 29. 

In  Live ATC recordings of conversations between the aircraft and air traffic controllers, a pilot aboard the C-212 (using the callsign Shady 2) is heard declaring an emergency, stating “We have lost our right wheel. We’d like to proceed to Raleigh and make the landing at Raleigh.”

In the recording, ATC confirms Raleigh-Durham is the desired airport and advises Shady 2 to resume its own navigation to Raleigh-Durham, some 78 nm away. 

ATC asks for information about the home base of the aircraft, how many people were on board and the amount of fuel. The pilot’s transmission indicates there were two people on board and they had enough fuel for approximately four hours of flying. 

Later in the transmission, ATC asks for verification that a wheel is missing from the aircraft as the result of a landing. The pilot replies, affirmative. Another voice replies, the wheel assembly has been found. A second voice from Shady 2 explains there was a hard landing and the aircraft went around “and at that point, we lost the wheel.”

A few minutes later the controller supplies Shady 2 with the telephone number for Fayetteville Approach to call when they are on the ground. The next transmission is Shady 2 checking in as they pass through 3,500 feet. 

ATC responds, asking how the pilot intends to land at Raleigh-Durham. The pilot replies, “As slow as we can and I guess we’re going to put it on the belly.” ATC comes back with, “You’re not planning to put the gear down?” The pilot of Shady 2 replies that the aircraft is a fixed gear airplane and the right main wheel is missing.

The one-wheel landing of Shady 2 was captured on video. The aircraft touches down on the remaining wheel and veers into the grass. Local authorities reported that the pilot had minor injuries and was taken to a local hospital. 

Local media and the Associated Press have identified the copilot as Charles Crooks, age 23. Crooks’ body was found in the backyard of a home about 20 miles from the airport, according to reports. Although reports said he departed the aircraft without a parachute, it has not been determined if Crooks fell or jumped from the C-212. Local media outlets interviewed family members who noted that Crooks loved to fly and was an experienced pilot. 

Several people in the neighborhood said they heard something hit the ground, one person remarking that it sounded like someone slamming a trash can lid.

At this time, authorities say they’re baffled as to how and why Crooks departed the aircraft.

According to a local television station, the pilot told authorities that the copilot jumped from the airplane before landing, aiming for a lake as they flew over.

In a prepared statement, the FAA noted their focus is on the emergency landing made by the  twin-engine CASA CN-212 Aviocar, which landed in the grass between Runways 23L and 23R at Raleigh-Durham International Airport. The statement noted that the National Transportation Safety Board will oversee an investigation and will provide additional updates. The FAA added, “Neither agency identifies people involved in aircraft accidents.”

The accident investigation kept runway 5R-23L closed at KRDU for the better part of 24 hours.

FLYING plans to update this story as more information becomes available.

The post Copilot’s Departure of Aircraft in Mid-Flight Baffles Authorities appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The innovative airplane parachute system installed in the Cirrus SR22 does not guarantee survival in an accident. Like any aircraft system, there are multiple factors that contribute to its success, including proper training.

When PIC James J. Durkin failed to deploy the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System, or CAPS, installed in the 2001 Cirrus SR22 G1 he was piloting in 2018—and the aircraft crashed, killing Durkin and a passenger—it sparked a lawsuit that put flight schools and CFIs around the country potentially on notice.

In the initial complaint, filed April 4, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division, Pennsylvania, the plaintiff, Patricia Grady, alleged that Aero-Tech Services, a flight school in Lancaster, and its employees, CFIs Zach Hurst and David Peachey, failed to adequately teach the CAPS system to PIC Durkin. Furthermore, Grady claimed in the suit that had Durkin received said instruction, the accident that killed Durkin and his passenger—her husband, Stephen Grady—“would not have occurred.”

In the end, the trial court dismissed the case, stating that the complaint “failed as a matter of law” because it was based solely on a theory of educational malpractice. The ruling stated: “Pennsylvania courts have not permitted cases of negligence resulting from alleged educational malpractice to persist.” 

Grady appealed, however, to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. In March, the appellate court upheld the dismissal, adopting the lower court’s opinion as its own. Essentially, that the plaintiff lacked a legal cause of action. Now, Grady has filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the petition in the next couple of months, said Laurie Salita, senior counsel of Skinner Law Group in Philadelphia, who represents Aero-Tech in the suit. “We obviously oppose the petition,” Salita said. Given the pending litigation, Salita and Aero-Tech were unable to comment further on the case.

Still, the Superior Court’s decision should give flight schools and CFIs a welcome sigh of relief—at least for now. FLYING delved deeper into the case to determine why the court ruled as it did and what it means for the aviation community, and will follow up once the Supreme Court decides on the plaintiff’s petition. 

The Fatal Accident 

The plaintiff’s husband, and Durkin, died on April 19, 2018, when the Cirrus SR22 Durkin was piloting crashed near Williamsburg, Pennsylvania. According to the National Transportation Safety Board’s accident report, Durkin took off from Lancaster Airport (KLNS) in Pennsylvania, en route for South Bend International (KSBN), Indiana. The flight plan was filed as a personal flight. After takeoff, Durkin asked to divert from his original flight plan to Altoona-Blair County Airport (KAOO), due to icing. The Cirrus was not equipped to fly in icing conditions, according to the NTSB report. 

The NTSB listed the cause of the accident as “loss of control in flight.” Photos of the aircraft wreckage showed the CAPS safety pin on the activation handle intact and the CAPS activation handle in its holder. This would indicate that Durkin either was unable to or did not attempt to deploy the CAPS system. In the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) for the SR22, the “normal operations” pre-flight checklist calls for the pilot to remove the CAPS safety pin during “preflight walkaround,” and to verify its removal during the “before starting engine” checklist, and again, in the “before takeoff checklist,” the lawsuit states. 

• WATCH A VIDEO: FLYING Explained: How Does Ice Affect Your Aircraft

The Lawsuit 

In the original complaint, the plaintiff, filing as the executrix and personal representative of her husband’s estate, alleged negligence on the part of CFIs Hurst and Peachey for not properly instructing Durkin in the CAPS system, and negligence on the part of the flight school for not ensuring that its flight instructors were qualified to train Durkin in the use of CAPS.

According to Cirrus, CAPS has saved the lives of more than 60 people in 30 different loss of control flight situations since it was installed in Cirrus aircraft. 

Following the trial court’s ruling to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff filed an appeal, arguing that flight schools “teach a precise activity” that is “ultrahazardous,” and therefore, should be an exception to the state’s “educational malpractice doctrine.”

The Pennsylvania Superior Court wasn’t swayed. In denying the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action, the court reiterated the lower court’s ruling, that “[a] cause of action seeking damages for acts of negligence in the educational process must be precluded by considerations of public policy,” because (1) “there is no clear definition of the standard of care for a reasonably prudent flight school for instruction on airplane specific safety mechanisms;” (2) “it is difficult to determine if the Defendants’ instruction on a certain subject would have prevented the Plaintiff’s damages;” (3) it would cause a flood of litigation because “virtually every future plane crash will raise the specter of a negligent training claim against the flight school or aviation training center … for no other reason than they have an attenuated connection to the pilot’s actions on the date of the crash since the flight school provided the pilot the knowledge to become licensed by the FAA;” and (4) “[t]rial courts have no business meddling in the field of day-to-day educational standards of pilot schools,” particularly because “[f]ederal regulations clearly delineate standards for certification and operation of Part 141 schools,” as cited in a synopsis of the case published by JD Supra. 

What It Means 

According to Widener University Commonwealth Law School professor Greg Randall “Randy” Lee, J.D., in allegations of educational malpractice, schools and teachers tend to have an advantage. 

One of the first things a court needs to determine in a lawsuit like this is if there’s a legal cause of action against the school or the teacher, he said. “In the vast majority of these cases, you don’t have a cause of action against any one of them.”

Lee explained, “When people tell you there’s no cause of action for educational malpractice, what they’re normally saying is that if I’m in my classroom as a teacher doing my thing, and you don’t like the way that I did it, or you didn’t feel like you learned from it, can you sue me because I didn’t ‘subjectively do it better?’” That answer is generally, no, unless the teacher fails to teach something that’s statutorily required, he said, citing two cases in Montana that ruled in favor of the plaintiff (B.M. v. State of Montana; and Yellow Kidney, et al. v. Montana Office of Public Instruction).

“You can sue a pilot for exercising bad judgment when he’s flying the plane. He doesn’t have to do something illegal to have a problem. He can just exercise bad judgment and he can get sued for professional malpractice. But that’s not the way we treat teachers,” Lee said. 

There are several reasons why the law gives latitude to teachers and educational institutions. Lee said these include: 

• “Malpractice claims would intrude on academic freedom (the right of schools and teachers to instruct in the ways they think best) and First Amendment free speech rights;
• “Schools facing malpractice claims might have to take resources away from education and use them to fight lawsuits;
• “The fear of lawsuits might cause schools to abandon their educational mission or interfere with their ability to design effective educational programs;
•  “Effective education is too hard to determine when students all learn differently and there are many different ways to teach. In addition, there are more topics than anyone can teach, and how does one decide which topics are absolutely necessary to teach.”

Per that last point, how can the court determine if a teacher is at fault for failing to teach or the student is at fault for failing to learn?

“If I’m teaching how to land a plane and five students in the class leave that class clueless because they couldn’t understand what I was talking about, and one of them knows exactly how to fly a plane, have I been ineffective as a teacher or are they ineffective as students?” Lee asked. “Who can really tell? And, even if it’s possible to figure that out, are courts really the best party to figure that out—or should we leave that to school boards, or principles, or someone else to determine that they’re not being an effective teacher?” 

FAA Regs May Buffer Schools Against Malpractice Suits

Per the court’s ruling, with regard to flight schools and claims of educational malpractice, there is an additional level of instructional oversight that would further dissuade the courts from getting involved: the FAA. 

According to Stephen “Steve” Dedmon, J.D., aviation law professor and associate chair of the College of Aviation at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, acting on claims of educational malpractice, like the one alleged by Grady, would put the courts in a precarious situation. “It would put them in a position to have to micro-manage all aspects of flight…and that is not their purview. They would also have to attempt to discern what a pilot actually learned, to what extent, over what period of time, what factors might have impeded application of that knowledge (fear, anxiety) and they cannot do that.”  

FAA-approved Part 141 flight schools are required to have an approved syllabus for instruction that outlines specific ground and flight modules. Additionally, Part 141 schools must monitor student pass/failure rates and the FAA may revoke their certification, Dedmon said. “They are also subject to their instructors being observed in a classroom or flight setting to assure they are teaching the specific module information.”

Flight schools operating under Part 61 are not as closely monitored by the FAA, and do not need to follow the requirements outlined in Part 141. Part 61 schools train students on a one-to-one or customized basis and have a more flexible training schedule. “[Under Part 61] I, as a CFI, can set my own ground or flight instruction as I wish. Or in many cases, ground instruction can be purchased from various commercial providers and is totally acceptable to pass the knowledge written and oral associated with obtaining a pilot certificate,” Dedmon said. 

While there are some differences, both Part 61 and Part 141 schools adhere to the same airman certification standards set by the FAA, which are used to assure that the pilot meets the requirements in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).

The defendant in this lawsuit, Aero-Tech Services, offers both Part 61 and Part 141 training options. 

While not required, Dedmon said as an attorney and a flight instructor, he would advocate for greater documentation of training details. “Practically speaking, logbook entries by the CFI showing the pilot had been advised of the operation of the CAP system as related to being in the POH [and told to consult it], and an entry showing the instructor demonstrated how to preflight the system would have been valuable evidence of pertinent instruction,” he said. “Granted you cannot document everything [as the court said]…but details count.”  

A note entered in Durkin’s logbook dated July 25, 2014, indicated that he “received the required training of section 61.31 (f) in an SR22 and was determined “proficient in the operation and systems of a high performance airplane.” There was no entry specific to CAPS training, so it is unclear if it took place. 

Not ‘Blanket Immunity’ 

While the Superior Court’s ruling may be seen as a win (for now) for flight schools and their employees, Dedmon cautioned that it doesn’t give them “blanket immunity” from claims of educational malpractice, and this was referenced in the lower court’s decision. “For example, if a flight school failed to warn of the deadly flight characteristics of an airplane that had resulted in a disproportionate number of crashes and fatalities,” it might be liable, he said. “Practically speaking, the issue here is what you know or do not know, but this is a reasonable expectation of CFIs and flight schools.” 

And, flight schools and other educational institutions may still be subject to claims of fraud (e.g., lying to a student to get them to enter into a contract) and breach of contract, Lee added.

The post Court Ruling Brings Sigh of Relief but Not Immunity to Flight Schools, CFIs appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

It happens with alarming frequency: You read a story in your local newspaper about someone pushing for the closure of the local airport. Perhaps it’s an election year, or locals accuse the airport of being solely a playground for the rich, a danger to public health, and/or an economic drain on the community. 

There are calls for the airport to be shut down and the property redeveloped—and sometimes these efforts span decades and are successful. Other times, the pilots and businesses in the community are able to thwart the closure effort using facts at a time when emotions are running high.

Case in Point: Whiteman Field

One of the latest airports to appear on the closure radar is Whiteman Field (KWHP) located in Pacoima, California. KWHP is one of five general aviation airports owned by Los Angeles County. 

The airport was built in 1946 in a neighborhood that at the time was filled with middle-class engineers and technicians, most of whom worked at local defense plants or by people who were involved in the movie-making industry. Most of the homes were built in the 1930s and the neighborhood thrived. 

As the years rolled on, the neighborhood surrounding the airport began to decline and the airport grew. In 1973, the county of Los Angeles purchased 100 acres of land adjacent to the airport, evicting a trailer park and revamping the property to lengthen and realign the runway so that it could accept larger aircraft.

Today, the airport sports a 4,120-by-75-foot paved runway and is home to approximately 600 aircraft, ranging from corporate turboprops to public agency helicopters. There are several businesses at the airport, including flight schools, light manufacturing, and storage. 

A satellite view of the airport shows it is now surrounded by homes and light industrial buildings, as well as freeways and railroad tracks. The neighborhoods around the airport are described by the local media as “low income housing.”

One of the most vocal groups supporting the airport’s closure is Pacoima Beautiful, a community organization that, according to its website, was established in 1996 by a group of concerned mothers who were worried about the pollution and deteriorating conditions of the community.  

The website alleges that “for the better part of 75 years, Whiteman Airport has been more detrimental than beneficial to our community,” and as such, they are calling on the county of Los Angeles to close the airport, which they perceive to be a playground for rich people with airplanes.

Steven Frasher, public information officer for Los Angeles County Public Works, says that is not an accurate assessment; instead, he says the airport is an economic engine.

“Whiteman Airport is home to numerous businesses, Glendale Community College’s pilot training program, and various non-profit aviation organizations,” he says. “As described in the 2020 Economic Impact Analysis for the County-owned airports, Whiteman Airport directly supports approximately 275 jobs, representing $22.7 million in employee wages. Overall, the airport and surrounding communities benefit from over $112 million in total airport-related—direct, indirect, and induced—spending each year.”

Frasher adds that the airport is home to law enforcement and firefighting operations, medical services, as well as youth programs and provides space for community events.

FLYING made several attempts to reach members of Pacoima Beautiful as well as members of the Pacoima City Council and the Los Angeles County and Board of Supervisors, but our telephone calls and emails have not been returned.

Accidents in the News

According to the NTSB—and feeding the calls for closure—there have been several accidents and incidents in the vicinity of KWHP over the past decade.

The most recent was in April when a Cessna Skymaster went down 4 miles north of the airport along a freeway embankment. According to the preliminary report, the twin had just taken off from KWHP when the pilot reported to the tower that his landing gear was not fully retracted. The pilot asked to stay over the airport and climb to 2,500 feet. The tower approved the request. There were no further radio transmissions from the pilot. Witnesses on the freeway reported seeing the airplane in a left turn then the nose dropped and the airplane spiraled to the ground. The pilot was killed, but no motorists were injured.

In January 2022, the airport made national news when the body camera of a police officer captured the rescue of the pilot of a Cessna 172 that made an off-airport landing on the railroad tracks near the airport after an uncommanded loss of engine power shortly after takeoff. The injured pilot was pulled to safety seconds before a train hit the aircraft. 

Foothill Division Officers displayed heroism and quick action by saving the life of a pilot who made an emergency landing on the railroad tracks at San Fernando Rd. and Osborne St., just before an oncoming train collided with the aircraft. pic.twitter.com/DDxtGGIIMo

— LAPD HQ (@LAPDHQ) January 10, 2022

The most publicized crash was in 2020, when a Civil Air Patrol Cessna 182 came down on a city street a few hundred feet short of the runway and within 50 feet of an occupied home. The pilot was killed, and the aircraft burst into flames.The pilot had reported a loss of engine power and was trying to glide to the airport. It was a VFR morning, and the video of the burning aircraft putting black smoke into the clear blue sky was on every television station in the area. The fire destroyed the aircraft and two parked cars. It also singed the front yard of a home. The homeowner—who still lives there—notes it is frightening to her when she hears aircraft overhead.

James Miller, the former manager of Whiteman Airport, notes there have been accidents at the airport, but that the city council and other elected officials are quick to exaggerate or misrepresent the facts.

“Their statements can be outrageously false,” he says. “People who want to close the airport make outrageous statements like ‘everyday people are dying from lead poisoning from the airport,’ and we ask, ‘Can you show us the 350 death certs from last year to show the statement is accurate and true?’ and of course they can’t.”

These exaggerations do get the attention of local politicians, says Miller, noting that after the January incident the Pacoima City council passed a resolution calling for the closure of the airport and urged the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to do the same.

In May, U.S. Rep. Tony Cárdenas, who represents the city of Pacoima in Los Angeles County, called on county officials and the FAA to close the airport for 30 days so that a safety audit could be completed. 

“The surrounding community is literally afraid for their lives,” Cárdenas told the Los Angeles Times. “There are way too many crashes coming in and out of Whiteman Airport.”

No Plans to Close the Airport

According to Miller, “None of the crashes have something to do with the safety of the airport—the control tower works, the airport has proper lighting, but there is no need to shut down the airport to conduct a survey. There have been incidents in the previous 10 years, but a gear-up landing or a hard landing is not an accident. An airplane running off the runway but not off the airport property is not an accident.”

“There is no plan to close the airport,” Frasher says. “Los Angeles County has not made any decision to close the airport, nor has it made any determination as to whether any FAA Airport Improvement Program grant funds could be returned to the Federal Aviation Administration.”

According to the FAA, “Los Angeles County, which owns Whiteman Airport, has received $4.8 million in Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants for Whiteman since 2006. The most recent grant was in 2021. When airport operators accept AIP grants, they agree to certain conditions. One of these conditions is to keep the airport open for at least 20 years from the date of the most recent grant.”

The FAA adds that they have not received a request from Los Angeles County to close Whiteman.

The post Is Your Airport in Danger? Whiteman Field Provides a Cautionary Tale appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The U.S. Navy grounded all non-deployed aircraft for a “safety pause” Monday following a string of fatal accidents last week, the service announced.

The news comes following crashes of two Navy and one U.S. Marine Corps aircraft in California last week. Two of the three accidents were fatal.

“As a result of recent crashes involving U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, Commander, Naval Air Forces has directed all non-deployed Navy aviation units to conduct a safety pause on June 13 in order to review risk-management practices and conduct training on threat and error-management processes,” the Naval Air Forces said in a statement.

• READ MORE: Crew Survives Navy MH-60S Crash in California

“In order to maintain the readiness of our force, we must ensure the safety of our people remains one of our top priorities,” the statement said.

Deployed aviation units have been directed to conduct the safety pause at the earliest opportunity, Naval Air Forces said.

Thursday evening, a U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk helicopter crashed near El Centro, California. All four air crew members on board the Seahawk survived the incident and were transported to Desert Regional Medical Center in Palm Springs for treatment, Naval Air spokesperson Ensign Bryan Blair told FLYING.

“Only one was treated for non-life threatening injuries, and all four were released,” Blair said.

The Seahawk was assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 3, based at Naval Air Station North Island, California. At the time of the mishap, the crew was conducting a routine training flight, which had originated from Naval Air Facility El Centro.

• READ MORE: MV-22B Osprey Crashes With Five Marines On Board

The location of the MH-60S crash site was about 40 miles from Glamis, California—where a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B went down during a training mission the day prior on June 8, killing all five crew members on board.

The tiltrotor aircraft was assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor (VMM) Squadron 364, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, which is based at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, California.

“This is an extremely difficult time for VMM-364, and it is hard to express the impact that this loss has had on our squadron and its families,” VMM-364 Commanding Officer Lt. Col. John C. Miller said in a statement.

The Marine Corps identified those killed in the June 8 incident as:

• Cpl. Nathan E. Carlson, 21, of Winnebago, Illinois, a tiltrotor crew chief.
• Capt. Nicholas P. Losapio, 31, of Rockingham, New Hampshire, an MV-22B pilot
• Cpl. Seth D. Rasmuson, 21, of Johnson, Wyoming, a tiltrotor crew chief
• Capt. John J. Sax, 33, of Placer, California, an MV-22B pilot
• Lance Cpl. Evan A. Strickland, 19, of Valencia, New Mexico, a tiltrotor crew chief

On June 3, Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet pilot Lt. Richard Bullock was killed when his aircraft went down during a routine training mission in a remote, unpopulated area near Trona, California. Bullock was assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 113 based at Naval Air Station Lemoore, California.

The post Navy Aviation Under ‘Safety Pause’ Following String of Crashes appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Familiarity in flying has several components. There is the foundational element of general familiarity with airplanes and how to fly them. There is familiarity with systems; this may be of a general kind (knowing how to lean the mixture or adjust a constant-speed propeller, for instance) or specific to a particular airplane or type (such as knowing to use the left main tank of an old Beech Bonanza for takeoff when both mains are full because all return fuel from the injection pump goes to the left tank).

There is familiarity with handling characteristics: whether, for example, a certain type pitches up or down with flap deflection. There is muscle memory, knowing how much effort will be required to pitch or roll, and where to reach to lower the gear or switch fuel tanks. There is knowledge of cruising performance, clean and dirty descent rates, quality of stall warning, and post-stall behavior.

Although FAA regulations set quite precise requirements for familiarity and currency—becoming more rigorous for more complex and higher-performance airplanes—it is really hard to tell how much familiarity is enough and, for that matter, whether there is such a thing as too much familiarity. A pilot may know an airplane very well but usually fly a different type. Habits acquired from the more recently flown, or more familiar, airplane might be unconsciously applied to the other. The key word is “unconscious.” Familiarity is the thing that allows you to act without thinking. “Without thinking” is commonly a reproach, but instinctive, unconscious flying is also the hallmark of a natural and skilled pilot. There is a middle ground to be found between too much thought and too little.

How to make the first flight in a homebuilt airplane is a subject of ongoing debate, with one school arguing for short runway hops, reasoning that a few feet is not very far to fall, and another for immediate up-and-away flight, in order to get far from the rocks and hard places as quickly as possible. The impatient purchaser of a Lancair 235 tried to have it both ways.

What Happened

The pilot, 81 years old, had not flown in six months. He had about 450 hours total time. He had no experience whatsoever in the Lancair, which was turned over to him by a broker who asked him not to fly it until he had found someone with experience in the type to fly with him. The pilot promised he would not; however, he wanted to taxi-test the airplane. On his second taxi run down the runway, as the surprised broker looked on, the airplane took off and flew away.

Most likely, the pilot did not intend to break his promise to the broker, who was his friend. The airplane probably became airborne unexpectedly, and he thought it best to get familiar with it before attempting a landing.

He was gone for an hour. When he finally returned, the pilot made two landing approaches, each time going around. A witness observed that the pilot was having trouble with pitch control: “Nose up, nose down…nose up, nose down.” On the third approach, he landed long, bounced twice, climbed to 100 or 150 feet, stalled, and spun.

The National Transportation Safety Board identified the pilot’s lack of familiarity with the airplane as a contributing factor, the cause of the fatal accident being simple failure to maintain flying speed. It’s possible, however, that the pilot was not only unfamiliar with the Lancair 235 in particular but also with airplanes in general that are flown with fingertips rather than a fist. An extremely sensitive airplane is difficult for an inexperienced pilot to cope with because anxiety makes you more ham-handed and likely to overcontrol.

Some airplanes have design quirks that set them apart from others. One is the Piper Comanche, whose manual pitch trim—like that of the Ford Trimotor—consists of a crank handle in the ceiling. Early Comanches did not have electric trim, the operation of which is intuitive: forward button means nose down/go faster. Vertical trim wheels are similarly natural. The overhead crank, however, has built-in unfamiliarity.

The 3,000-hour pilot of a Comanche 250 was observed adjusting the overhead trim control as he taxied out to depart. During the takeoff roll, the propeller struck the runway surface. After breaking ground, the airplane pitched up, stalled and crashed vertically, killing all three aboard.

In principle, it should be impossible to strike a prop even with a flat nosewheel tire and a fully compressed nose strut. However, the nose-strut drag links and torque link were fractured “as if the nose gear had been forced rearward while extended.” Whether this damage arose from the crash or preceded it could not be determined; what was determined, though, was that the pitch trim was set in the full nose-down position, which would have the effect of lifting the tail as the airplane gained speed.

• READ MORE: Previous editions of Peter Garrison’s ‘Aftermath’

Another Comanche crashed somewhat similarly, although the fragmentation of the wreckage was such that the trim setting could not be determined. It was the 700-hour pilot’s second solo flight in the airplane, which he had bought two weeks earlier. He had taken the precaution of getting 15 hours of dual in it in the meantime. A witness reported the pilot appeared to intend to perform a short-field takeoff: He ran up to full power before releasing the brakes. The airplane seemed to rotate prematurely, and the witness, who was an experienced pilot, judged that it looked slow. Rather than level out to gain speed, however, it kept climbing “steeper and steeper” until it stalled and spiraled to the ground.

Although this was an early Comanche, manufactured in 1959, it was equipped with electric trim. The overhead trim is faster-acting, however. The inexorable increase in pitch angle is suggestive of an airplane that was either mistrimmed in the first place or whose pilot is inadvertently applying trim in the wrong direction while trying to get the nose down.

Fuel systems, especially ones in low-wing airplanes, which do not have a “both” position, can be a source of trouble. There are many instances of pilots using an empty tank for takeoff when there was fuel in another. Opportunities for confusion multiply as tanks become more numerous.

A 1,300-hour commercial pilot, flying a single equipped with aftermarket tip tanks, crashed while trying to return to land immediately after taking off. The pilot, who had only a few hours in the airplane, had taken off with the fuel selector on a tip tank, although use of the tip tanks was limited to whatever is meant by “level flight.” The NTSB’s report on the fatal accident does not provide information about the pilot’s previous experience, but the fact that he took off with a tip tank selected suggests he probably landed on his preceding flight with that same tank selected—also forbidden—and his previous experience may have been in airplanes, such as high-wing Cessnas, that do not require so much attention to tank selection.

Mistakes breed in the shadowy land between the systematic and the instinctive. Only by forcing our actions up into the realm of conscious procedure—for instance, by methodical use of checklists and each crewmember’s critical attention to the actions of the other—can we reduce our reliance on instinct and the unconscious errors that come with it.

This story originally published in the December 2019 issue of Flying Magazine

The post A Pilot Gets Caught Between Procedure and Instinct appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Chinese officials have confirmed there are no survivors in Monday’s crash of the China Eastern Airlines Flight MU5735. The accident involving the Boeing 737-800 killed 123 passengers and nine crew members.

The airline is reaching out to the families of the 132 people on board.

“Our thoughts are with the passengers and crew of China Eastern Airlines Flight MU 5735,” Boeing said in a statement. “We are working with our airline customers and are ready to support them. 

• READ MORE: Things to Know about the Boeing 737-800

“Boeing is in contact with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and our technical experts are prepared to assist with the investigation led by the Civil Aviation Administration of China.”

The area where the aircraft went down is the sparsely populated Guangxi region. Residents reported hearing an explosion, then seeing fire on the mountainside. The first people to arrive on site were farmers, who described seeing “heavily fragmented wreckage” but no remains. The crash happened around 2:20 p.m. local time. 

Chinese officials immediately dispatched nearly 1,000 firefighters and 100 members of a local militia to the scene.

China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, quickly issued a statement calling for rescuers to do their utmost and “handle the aftermath in a proper manner.”

Investigators worked through the night by flashlight, and are using drones to search and map the area, which is described as being covered with airplane parts and scraps of clothing.

Some personal effects such as wallets, ID cards, and parts of a cell phone have been found, but there are no reports of human remains being recovered.

Of particular interest to investigators are the aircraft’s flight data and cockpit recorders, the so-called “black boxes.” Investigators hope the information in these recorders will help them determine what brought the aircraft down. So far, one of the black boxes has been found.

The investigation is being led by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). Boeing, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the FAA, and the engine manufacturer CFM are assisting. This is standard procedure for aircraft accidents that occur overseas involving aircraft designed in the U.S.

The investigation and recovery is being hampered in part by deteriorating weather. A cold front with heavy rain is moving into the area.

The accident is China’s worst air disaster in more than a decade.

What Happened

The Boeing 737-800 Next Generation or NG was enroute from Kunming, the capital city of the Yunnan province in southwest China, to Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong near Hong Kong. The flight should have taken about 90 minutes.

According to aircraft tracking data from Flightradar24, approximately one hour into what should have been a 90-minute flight the aircraft entered a steep descent.

The aircraft had been in cruise flight at 21,900 feet when it entered a drive, recovering momentarily at 8,000 feet then descending again. The 737’s ADS-B signal indicated a vertical speed of  31,000 fpm down.

The post Authorities Sift Through Wreckage of China Eastern Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Baylor University and Waco Regional Airport (KACT) may partner soon to bring students onto the tarmac at Waco Regional Airport to investigate real-life aviation accidents. 

Joel Martinez, airport director at Waco Regional and adjunct professor at Baylor, welcomes the proposal. 

“I am excited for Baylor and Waco Airport to work together and get the students to the airfield.”

The class, “Accident and Investigation,” has been at Baylor for a few years. Adjunct professor Charles “Andy” Olvis teaches the class—he’s a senior air traffic investigator in the National Transportation Safety Board’s Office of Aviation Safety. 

But the new partnership could bring added value to the class.

Olvis would acquire aircraft wreckage and recreate a real-world aircraft accident that the NTSB has investigated. Students will then analyze the accident, interview mock witnesses, and determine variables that were present that may have caused the accident. 

A trial version of the class was conducted in 2018, and since then, Baylor, Waco Regional, and the city have been working together to make it a permanent course on the airfield.

The idea has been approved by the airport and is awaiting approval by the city. 

Martinez believes the addition to the class will be a good opportunity for students to be exposed to the real nitty gritty side of aviation. 

“I really feel like [this type of program] should be at an airport. I do as much as I can to promote aviation. It’s a good opportunity for students and I hope it will bring more interested students to Waco.”

The post Proposed Partnership Could Make Accident Investigation Real for Baylor Students appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Near noon on a warm August day, a Cessna T210N, inbound from Colorado Springs, approached Meadow Lake Airport (KFLY), at Peyton, Colorado. The field elevation is 6,877 feet, but the density altitude was closer to 10,000. A gusty 10-knot wind blew from the north. Two Cessna 150s were in the pattern doing touch-and-goes, making right traffic for Runway 33.

The 210 passed south of the traffic pattern, turned north well east of the downwind leg—the area west of the airport is residential—and then entered the pattern behind the trainer that had just turned downwind. The 210 followed the 150, gaining on it slowly, and extended its downwind until the 150 had turned final.

By the time the 210 turned base, it had drifted somewhat westward, perhaps because of the quartering tailwind or because the runway, which was on the pilot’s right, was so far behind him that he could no longer accurately judge his position with respect to it. The 210 overshot the extended centerline, and the pilot turned tightly in order to re-establish himself on the final approach course. Rolling out of the turn at a very low altitude but still a mile from the runway, the 210 stalled, crashed, and burned. The pilot, a 46-year-old doctor with 200 hours, died.

Conflicting Reports

The NTSB, noting that there was no evidence of a mechanical malfunction and that the airplane carried ample fuel, concluded that “…it is likely that the pilot entered the traffic pattern behind a slower airplane, and, in an attempt to add more space between his airplane and the one ahead, he reduced speed and increased airplane pitch to the point where it exceeded critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall as he turned onto the final leg of the traffic pattern.”

The board’s analysis does not match the actual circumstances of the accident. It may have been influenced by the account of the instructor in the 150 that was ahead of the 210, who suggested that the pilot of the 210 may have slowed his “much faster” airplane to keep distance between himself and the slower 150. In fact, by the time the 210 stalled, the 150 had ceased to be a factor at all. 

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FAA radar recordings show the 210 in trail behind the 150 on the downwind, with a groundspeed of about 110 knots. Correcting for density altitude, and taking into account a tailwind component of around 10 knots, this translates to a true airspeed of around 85-90 knots—not excessively slow for a 210.

The 210 maintained a fairly constant height on the downwind leg until the runway was behind it, when it began to descend. Its groundspeed increased by about five knots as it turned base, suggesting that the wind may have been more easterly than reported. The combination of its westward drift and its increased groundspeed on base carried it past the extended centerline. The pilot of the 150 described the 210 as “banking steeply” from base to final and then pitching up slightly.

The striking thing about the radar data is the rapid loss of both altitude and groundspeed—nearly 25 knots—during the turn to final. Some of the loss of groundspeed resulted from turning into the wind, but it is more difficult to account for the loss of altitude. By the time the stall occurred, the 210 was still a mile from the end of the runway, but was reported by one witness to be only 30 to 50 feet above the ground. Another witness told a newspaper reporter, “I have never seen a plane flying so close over my head.”

About The Pilot

Investigators uncovered a couple of pieces of information that seemed relevant in retrospect. A mechanic who had flown with the pilot to break in some newly replaced cylinders recalled that he had to remind him to use flaps. Photographs of the wreckage show clearly that the flaps were retracted.  With a forward CG, 30 degrees of flap would have reduced the 210’s stalling speed in a 45-degree bank by nine knots. 

The pilot had failed his first private check ride. His deficiencies were in soft field takeoffs and short field landings. Both are skills requiring sensitivity to the feel of an airplane at speeds close to the stall. An instructor who gave the pilot eight additional hours of instruction before endorsing him for retest did not remember much about him, but did comment that eight additional hours after a failed private ride seemed like a lot.

The standard glidepath angle for a landing approach, used by both ILS and VASI systems, is three degrees, which requires a height of almost 300 feet a mile from the runway threshold. The pilot’s excessively low altitude when turning to final hints that, possibly from force of habit or because he was too dependent on “the numbers,” he may have descended with the manifold pressure setting that he would use for a normal base leg, much closer to the runway. The added drag of the steep turn would have eaten up some speed. The “slight” pitch up reported by the witness suggests that the pilot belatedly became aware of his low altitude and instinctively attempted to correct it by raising the nose.

Since there is no aim point until you turn final, flying a pattern requires some intuitive spatial sense and a feel for distances and descent rates. Novices crave precise guidelines, but they are elusive. 

The size and shape of the pattern can be adjusted to suit the airplane and the circumstances; a faster airplane overtaking a slower one, for instance, need not remain in trail, but can sidestep outward. 

A pilot extending the downwind for traffic should not begin to descend on passing the threshold; in fact, in the extreme case of a downwind leg extended three miles, the descent should begin only with the final approach. 

A pattern flown on the upwind side of the runway in crosswind conditions should be shifted outward in order to avoid overshooting on the base leg. All such adjustments are learned from experience; they cannot be readily converted into exact prescriptions.

Two rules, however, apply in almost all circumstances. One is that unless instructed to by the tower, you should not allow your indicated airspeed to drop below around 1.3 times your stalling speed until you are on short final and, as they say, “landing is assured.” Luckily for the mathematically impaired, this multiplication can be performed on the ground before taking off.

• READ MORE: Previous editions of “Aftermath”

The other is that you should never make steeply banked turns at low speed and low altitude.

The pilot of the 210 made several minor errors. He flew his downwind leg in trail behind the 150, although the 210, a faster airplane, naturally would call for a wider pattern. He began his descent from the downwind on passing the threshold, although the 150 ahead of him had shown no sign of turning base. And, on seeing that he had overshot the centerline, he tried to hurry back to it. There was no need to hurry; because he was now more than a mile from the runway, he could have taken his time.

Low-time pilots make small errors like this every day. They are rarely fatal. But this time, the accumulation of innocuous elements turned into a massive failure of energy management. The pilot lost awareness of speed and altitude—and that error can easily be fatal.

Editor’s Note: This article is based on the NTSB reports of these accidents and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention.

The post For One Low-Time Pilot, A Pattern of Small Errors Proves Fatal appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The NTSB cites a lack of pilot experience in the 2019 loss of a Cessna 421 Golden Eagle that killed three people in DeLand, Florida.

Armand Girouard, 27, and Shawna Carbonaro, 34, both of DeLand, and Ernedro Philippe, 32, of Kissimmee, Florida, were killed when the multiengine airplane they were in went down in a wooded area the afternoon of September 29, 2019.

According to NTSB records, the aircraft was purchased in June 2019 for $35,000 by Martin Flores of Texas. Flores told the NTSB that he bought the aircraft as an investment. He purchased the aircraft through an eBay auction, paying $6,000 for the repairs and another $4,500 for a pilot to ferry the aircraft to Texas.

After repairs were made, he intended to sell the airplane.

Flores told investigators that it was his understanding that the mechanic who was performing the repairs had found an instructor to fly the aircraft, and the name of his contact was a person named “Ernedro.”

The mechanic stated that Philippe was identified as the pilot who would ferry the airplane to the owner after repairs were made. However, Philippe, a private pilot with 155 hours, did not have the required training or certification to legally fly the complex, high-performance multiengine aircraft.

Girouard held a commercial pilot certificate for both single- and multiengine airplanes and a flight instructor rating for single-engine airplanes. His logbook indicated 500 hours total time, of which 40 was in multiengine airplanes. Girouard’s logbook did not show a complex endorsement or a record of an instruction received in a Cessna 421. The investigation also indicated the toxicology report noted Girouard had THC, a derivative of marijuana, in his system at the time of the accident, but it was not clear if he was impaired.

The owner of the aircraft had not given permission for the flight to take place. The mechanic in charge of making the repairs to the aircraft stated that he also had not given permission for the flight, as neither the repairs or the required paperwork and inspections required to return the aircraft to service had been completed.

What Happened

Two witnesses in the vicinity of the accident described the aircraft flying between 1,000 and 2,000 feet above the ground. One witness described seeing the 421 “roll three times” before he lost sight of it as it descended into a wooded area approximately four miles from the departure airport. The landing gear and flaps appeared to be in the retracted position. The witness stated he heard the engines make “two pop sounds.”

The wreckage was found at the base of a tree in an upright position. The cockpit was crushed and the fuselage fragmented. There was evidence of a post-accident fire that consumed the left wing. It was determined that both engines were producing power at the time of impact, as the propellers were not feathered and there were freshly cut branches at the wreckage site. There were no indications of pre-impact flight control or engine malfunctions that contributed to the accident.

Based on the pilot’s lack of any documented training in the accident airplane and the witness statements the NTSB concluded that the pilot most likely lost control of the aircraft. The NTSB stated it was likely Girouard who was acting as pilot in command at the time, although there was no record of him ever having flown a Cessna 421 before.

The post NTSB Blames Inexperienced Pilot for Accident That Killed Three appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

One pilot was killed and two others injured Friday morning during a mishap involving two T-38C Talon trainer aircraft at Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas. 

The incident happened at about 10 a.m. on a runway, according to a statement released by the base.

One of the injured pilots was transported to Val Verde Regional Medical Center in Del Rio, Texas, where they were treated and released, the release states. The other pilot is in critical condition and was evacuated by air to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio. 

“Losing teammates is unbelievably painful and it is with a heavy heart I express my sincere condolences,” said Col. Craig Prather, 47th Flying Training Wing commander, in a statement. “Our hearts, thoughts, and prayers are with our pilots involved in this mishap and their families.” 

The names of the pilots involved are being withheld until 24 hours after the next of kin notification has been made, the statement reads. 

The investigation into what occurred is ongoing.

The post One Pilot Dead, Two Injured in Runway Incident in Texas appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared on FreightWaves.com.

An air tanker pilot died in an accident Tuesday evening while attempting to extinguish the Kruger Rock wildfire in northern Colorado.

The pilot has been identified as Marc Thor Olson, according to CO Fire Aviation Inc., the company that owned the aircraft.

“The CO Fire Aviation family is deeply saddened by the sudden, tragic loss of one of our brothers serving as a tanker pilot,” officials said in a statement on Facebook.

CO Fire Aviation also said that Olson was a veteran who served for 32 years in both the U.S. Army and Air Force. He began flying airplanes in 1979 and logged more than 8,000 total flight hours, including 1,000 hours of night flight.

Olson took off from Colorado Regional Airport in Loveland just before 6:15 p.m. MT, circling the fire a few times before dropping off the radar and never returning to the airport, according to FlightAware.

The Larimer County Sheriff’s Office began investigating reports of the accident around 6:37 p.m., according to a press release. They located the site around 9:49 p.m. and said Olson was the only person in the plane.

The aircraft is an Air Tractor 802F single-engine, fixed-winged tanker equipped with night-vision technology, which allows the pilot to see terrain through smoke and clouds, making it easier to locate hot spots. The Tuesday flight, designed to test the system during actual fire conditions, was the first at night in Colorado for this aircraft.

CO Fire Aviation said it’s cooperating with the Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation SafetyBoard as the agencies investigate the cause.

Olson told KUSA-TV that he was excited to “make history” with the flight.

“Pretty cool thing to be a part of, I think,” Olson said before taking off. “This is the culmination of about five years of pretty hard work.”

The Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control said Wednesday that it’s been studying the use of aircraft in night operations on woodland fires at its Center of Excellence in Rifle.

Through its studies, the organization found that aerial support at night potentially offers increased advantages in fighting wildfires because of lower temperatures, increased humidity and reduced winds compared to daylight hours. However, most of the studies focused on helicopters and not fixed-wing aircraft.

“The use of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft at night, using vision technology, is widely and successfully used by the U.S. military and in certain public safety environments, but there is less research and practical experience with fixed wing assets in wildland fire suppression,” officials said in a release.

Tuesday night’s accident wasn’t the first time a fixed-wing air tanker went down while responding to a wildfire. On July 18, 2002, a four-engine World War II vintage PB4y impacted terrain while dropping retardant on a 4,100-acre fire near Estes Park.

An investigation by the NTSB determined the cause stemmed from fatigue cracks that led to the structural failure of the wings.

Six years later, firefighting pilot Gert Marais of Fort Benton, Montana, was killed when his single-engine airplane went down after dumping fire retardant at Fort Carson, Colorado.

The fire that started Tuesday morning was burning 146 acres and was 60 percent contained as of Thursday evening, according to the Larimer County Sheriff’s Office.

The post Tanker Pilot Dies While Fighting Colorado Wildfire appeared first on FLYING Magazine.